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INTRODUCTION
Courts and commentators often label federal discrimination statutes as
torts.1 Since the late 1980s, the courts increasingly applied tort concepts to
these statutes.2 This Article details a radical shift in the prominence and
importance of tort law within discrimination jurisprudence. It then explores
how the Supreme Court’s modern statutory analysis misunderstands both
tort law and discrimination law.
The Supreme Court’s use of tort common law in discrimination cases
has become more robust and automatic over time. In the late 1980s, the
Court noted that “common-law principles may not be transferable in all
their particulars to Title VII.”3 By 2011, the Court declared: “[W]e start
from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the
background of general tort law.”4 It then automatically applied proximate
cause to an employment statute.5 The Supreme Court now claims that
discrimination statutes’ status as torts conveys specific textual statutory
meaning.6
The reflexive use of tort law in employment discrimination cases is
problematic for many reasons. When applying tort law to discrimination
claims, the Court fails to consider the important fact that Congress
fundamentally altered the common law employment relationship when it
made it illegal for employers to discriminate based on protected traits. The
Court counterintuitively assumes that even though the discrimination
statutes change the common law—the at-will employment relationship—
Congress meant to retain common law meanings for statutory words. This
argument is facially problematic, especially because the Supreme Court did
not interpret the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)
1. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192 (2011); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129
S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1990); DAN B. DOBBS,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 102, at 237 n.2 (2000); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the
Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their
Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 72 n.33 (1995). But see Robert Belton, Causation in
Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235 (1988) (arguing that common law
causation principles should not be robustly applied to discrimination law).
2. For a complete discussion of this evolution of thought, see infra Part I. See also Theodore
Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a
Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990) (discussing decisions from the 1989 Supreme Court
term that applied common law concepts to employment law).
3. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986), quoted in Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 792 (1998).
4. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191.
5. Id. at 1192.
6. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2532–33 (2013).
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or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through a common law lens
during the first three decades after their enactment.7
The tort label is also difficult to mesh with textualist statutory
interpretation. The discrimination statutes are not structured like torts and
do not rely primarily on tort terms of art. When plaintiffs prove
discrimination claims, they are not proving elements that mimic any
traditional common law tort. Another conceptual error occurs when the
Court borrows indiscriminately from across tort regimes without
recognizing that various pockets of tort obligations reflect different
doctrinal choices that may not transfer well to other pockets of obligation.
For example, the Supreme Court repeatedly applies negligence concepts to
discrimination claims, even though it also claims that disparate treatment
claims require proof of intent.8
The tort label also overestimates the work that tort law can adequately
perform in statutory interpretation. Tort law generally does not have
independent descriptive power. It does not cohere around a narrow enough
set of theoretical or doctrinal concepts to provide an answer to many
statutory questions. The Supreme Court often ignores the possibilities
provided by tort law and explains tort law as being more fixed, narrow, and
normatively uncontested than it actually is.
When the Court describes tort law, it has already made important
choices about which portions of tort law to integrate into discrimination
law, and these choices involve narrow conceptions of causation and harm.
Using this narrow tort frame leads to discrimination law that is primarily
concerned with individual remedies, rather than a broader response to
societal discrimination. The move to tort law is thus part of a broader story
about the privatization of discrimination law that can be seen in the greater
acceptance of private arbitration9 and the move away from systemic
discrimination claims.10
Prioritizing a narrow view of tort law removes textually supportable
options from statutory analysis without meaningful discussion about why
the courts narrowed the potential statutory landscape. The courts never
consider whether their narrow notions of tort causation and harm are
reflected in the discrimination statutes’ text, intent, or purpose. The
primary aim of this Article is to urge courts to respect the complexity of
the judgments at issue by resisting the simple, but also simplistic, allure of
the reflexive use of tort law. While these errors are problematic when tort
7. See infra Section I.A.
8. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 & n.15 (1977).
9. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1465–66 (2009) (enforcing a union
agreement to arbitrate individual civil rights claims).
10. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552, 2561 (2011) (holding that each
plaintiff had to establish that she was discriminated against in the same way).
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law is used as persuasive authority, they become even more problematic
when tort law is given a high priority in discrimination analysis.
This is not to argue that tort law has no place in statutory construction.
It provides a language for discussing competing concerns and encapsulates
a wealth of prior thinking about difficult issues. Theoretical and doctrinal
debates in tort law are important because they help to elucidate which
values should be prioritized and why. But calling a statute a tort does not
automatically ground it in a specific theoretical construct or even a narrow
range of constructs and thus the explanatory power of the organizational
label is weak.
This Article demonstrates the dangers of the tort label, using the lens of
two core discrimination statutes: Title VII and the ADEA.11 However, the
discussion has broader implications. Courts have applied the tort label to a
variety of statutes and in a wide array of contexts.12
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the move to tortify
federal discrimination law. Parts II, III, and IV highlight serious problems
with the way the courts understand, use, and apply tort law in the
discrimination context. Part V discusses the stakes of the tort label,
including its tendency to lead to unsatisfactory reasoning that is not
supported by congressional intent or by the statutes’ text, history, or
structure.
I. THE TORTIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Courts, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and
legal scholars often describe the core federal antidiscrimination statutes as
torts.13 Over the past several decades, courts have increasingly used tort
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–
34 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (ADEA). The arguments made in this Article are applicable in the ADA
context as well. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (ADA). The author is not making
arguments about cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
12. See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1502 (2012) (describing how the Supreme
Court has applied common law immunity principles to claims under § 1983); Staub v. Proctor
Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011) (applying tort doctrines to the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act and citing cases); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512
U.S. 532, 543 (1994) (applying common law negligence concepts to the Federal Employers’
Liability Act (FELA)); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531–33 (1983) (describing the application of common law rules to the
Sherman Act).
13. See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1990) (referring to the ADEA as a
statutory tort); Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 72 n.33; Cheryl Krause Zemelman, The AfterAcquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII
and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 196–97 (1993) (discussing the
wide acceptance of Title VII violations as torts). Two commentators note that the move to the tort
common law was cemented during the 1989 Supreme Court term. See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note
2, at 3. But see William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal to Let
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law to interpret these statutes. This Part discusses how the Supreme Court
has changed the way it invokes tort law over time.
A. The Pre-Tort Years: 1964–1988
Title VII, which is considered to be the cornerstone federal
discrimination statute, provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.14
Although not identical, the ADEA has similarly broad operative
language.15 The language of both of these statutes is inexact, and Congress
did not specifically define key concepts such as “otherwise to discriminate”
or “because of.”16
Early Supreme Court decisions interpreting these statutes did not
explicitly invoke tort law to define key concepts, such as causation, intent,
or harm. In 1971, the Supreme Court decided Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,17
its first case to consider intent, causation, and harm questions under Title
VII. In Griggs, the Court recognized a disparate impact theory under Title
VII18 and, in doing so, the Court did not draw upon tort law. The Court
explicitly rejected the idea that Title VII requires a showing of intent.19 The
reasoning of the case focused on the goals of Title VII, the interests of
Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 478 (2013) (arguing that the
1973 McDonnell Douglas decision was a masked form of res ipsa loquitur).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006). This Article does not significantly discuss the Americans with
Disabilities Act, although it contains broad operative language similar to that of Title VII and the
ADEA. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 2011).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 630; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
17. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
18. See id. at 430–31.
19. Id. at 432.
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employers, and an eye toward the practical realities of rules that created
“built-in headwinds.”20 The Court also recognized that EEOC guidelines
were entitled to deference.21
In 1973, the Court decided McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,22 the
next major case to explain the core protections of Title VII. In McDonnell
Douglas, the Supreme Court created a three-part, burden-shifting test for
analyzing individual disparate treatment cases.23 Under McDonnell
Douglas, a court first evaluates the prima facie case, which requires proof
of the following:
(i) [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of complainant’s qualifications.24
If the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination arises.25 The burden of production then shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting
the employee.26 If the defendant meets this requirement, the plaintiff can
still prevail by demonstrating that the defendant’s reason for the rejection
was simply pretext.27 This three-part test does not invoke specific tort
principles and does not mimic any particular tort.
During this time, the Court also determined the contours of pattern or
practice claims and religious accommodation claims without relying on tort
doctrine.28 The strongest use of tort ideas during this time period occurred
in the remedies context.29 In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,30 the
20. Id. at 430–32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id. at 433–34.
22. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
23. Id. at 802–04.
24. Id. at 802. The factors considered in the prima facie case may vary depending on the
factual scenario presented in the case. Id. at 802 n.13.
25. Id. at 802.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 804. In later cases, the Court clarified how the test operates, but the Court did not
rely on tort concepts in these later cases. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507–08
(1993); Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–56 (1981).
28. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84–85 (1977); Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360–61 (1977).
29. Recently, the Supreme Court implied that City of Los Angeles Department of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978), used tort law. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524–25 (2013). While the case did use the words, “but for,” there is no strong
indication that the Court was invoking tort law. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711.
30. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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Supreme Court described Title VII as requiring a “make whole” remedy.31
However, this analysis was not based solely on tort law, as the Court also
invoked contract principles.32 It also noted that Title VII’s back pay remedy
derived from the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).33 In another case,
in a nonemployment civil rights context, a plurality rejected the idea that “a
civil rights action for damages constitutes nothing more than a private tort
suit benefiting only the individual plaintiffs whose rights were violated.”34
Toward the end of this era, the Court also suggested that it would be
appropriate to apply common law principles of agency to sexual
harassment claims, but declined to definitively rule on this issue.35
Importantly, the Court noted that “such common-law principles may not be
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII.”36
Until 1989, the Supreme Court did not rely heavily on tort analysis or
common law analysis in discrimination cases brought under Title VII or
the ADEA.37 Rather, the initial contours of pattern and practice, disparate
31. Id. at 418–19 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court further reasoned:
If backpay were awardable only upon a showing of bad faith, the remedy would
become a punishment for moral turpitude, rather than a compensation for workers’
injuries. This would read the “make whole” purpose right out of Title VII, for a
worker’s injury is no less real simply because his employer did not inflict it in
“bad faith.”
Id. at 422; see also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982) (discussing the make whole
purpose of Title VII); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978) (“[W]here words are employed
in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this
country they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary.” (alteration in original) (quoting Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59
(1911)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764
(1976) (discussing the make whole nature of a Title VII remedy); id. at 774–75 & n.34 (also noting
that the NLRA is the model for discrimination damages).
32. Moody, 422 U.S. at 418–19 (citing Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867));
see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 74 (1984) (using contract language to describe
Title VII).
33. Moody, 422 U.S. at 419.
34. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986).
35. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
36. Id.
37. See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91–92 (1981) (rejecting a
common law right of contribution under Title VII); Texas Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 253–54 (1981) (discussing how the presumption created by a prima facie case is a feature
of the common law created by previous Supreme Court cases). In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976), the Court indicated that a plaintiff could
prevail if she established “but for” cause. In a later case, the plurality noted that this did not
describe the minimal causal standard that a plaintiff is required to meet. Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 n.6 (1989) (discussing that the plaintiff does have to show a “but for”
cause, but if the plaintiff is able to, she will prevail).
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treatment, sexual harassment,38 and disparate impact occurred without
heavy reliance on tort law.39
B. The Middle Years: 1989–2008
The Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins40 is a
watershed case in the intersection of tort and discrimination law. After this
case, the Supreme Court began to use tort law more often in discrimination
cases. However, during this period the use of tort law was not usually
automatic, and when the Court invoked tort law, it balanced the use of tort
law principles with the needs of the discrimination statutes.
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiff
could prevail on a Title VII claim if she could show that both legitimate
and discriminatory reasons played a role in the employer’s refusal to
promote her.41 In a concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
proclaimed that Title VII is a “statutory employment ‘tort.’”42
Justice O’Connor’s use of the tort label is problematic in several
respects. Justice O’Connor cited no authority for this statement.43 She does
not provide a historical, theoretical, or doctrinal account of the relationship
between common law torts and Title VII.44 Her description of tort law is
narrow to the extent that she characterized the words “because of” to mean
“but for” cause.45 Justice O’Connor described tort causation as requiring
“but for” cause, but did not note that the common law also provides other
factual cause standards.46
At the same time, her concurrence did not reflect the rigid formality that
would occur in later cases. While Justice O’Connor believed that causation
meant “but for” cause, she disaggregated this question from the question of
38. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67; Martha Chamallas, Beneath the Surface of Civil Recourse
Theory, 88 IND. L.J. 527, 538–39 (2013) (discussing a debate about the intersection of tort law and
sexual harassment).
39. The minimal role played by tort law during this period is even more remarkable given that
the Supreme Court had conceptualized other civil rights statutes as torts during this period. For
example, in 1974, the Court characterized the housing discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights
Act as “sound[ing] basically in tort.” Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1974). The Court
was not able to decide what the closest tort analog should be. See id. at 195 & n.10 (arguing that
housing discrimination could be like common law innkeeper duties, defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, or a dignitary tort).
40. 490 U.S. 228.
41. Id. at 232.
42. Id. at 264 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 261–79.
45. Id. at 262–63 (citing Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421, 499 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)).
46. Id.; see, e.g., Taylor v. Fishkind, 51 A.3d 743, 759 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012)
(recognizing “substantial factor” as a factual cause standard in tort causation).
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which party was responsible for proving causation.47 Justice O’Connor
viewed the case as requiring the Court to determine “what allocation of the
burden of persuasion on the issue of causation best conforms with the
intent of Congress and the purposes behind Title VII.”48 Her analysis drew
on the foundation of prior Title VII and constitutional cases but did not
describe how the common law of torts intersects with these statutory and
constitutional sources.49 She also recognized that given the specific ways
employment decisions are made, requiring a plaintiff to prove that a
protected trait was a definitive reason for an employment outcome may be
“tantamount to declaring Title VII inapplicable to such decisions.”50
The other Justices’ responses to Justice O’Connor’s claim that Title VII
is a tort demonstrated the weak power of the tort label in 1989. A plurality
of four Justices described the statutory problem before it, not through the
lens of tort law, but rather as a broader question about the nature of
causation.51 The issue was not about what tort law required, but about what
kind of conduct violates Title VII. The plurality recognized that this
question required the Court to consider how Title VII balanced the interests
of employees and employers.52 It rejected the idea that causation meant that
the plaintiff is required to establish “but for” cause.53 The plurality
reasoned that “[t]o construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand
for ‘but-for causation,’ . . . is to misunderstand them.”54 Justice Byron
White’s concurrence also rejected the automatic use of tort law to resolve
the case, and instead relied on First Amendment case law.55
The dissent in Price Waterhouse is also relevant to the development of
the tort label. Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia, reasoned that to impose a standard
less than “but for” cause is to “impose liability without causation.”56 This
statement about tort law is simply incorrect and foreshadowed later
misunderstanding of tort law. The dissent also tried to characterize prior
Title VII cases as relying on tort law, even though the cases themselves did
not specifically draw on tort law.57
47. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262–63 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
48. Id. at 263. Justice O’Connor cited multiple tort cases that allowed burden shifting to
bolster her position. Id. at 263–64.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 273.
51. Id. at 237 (plurality opinion).
52. Id. at 239.
53. Id. at 239–40.
54. Id. at 240.
55. Id. at 258–60 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
56. Id. at 282 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 282; see, e.g., Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984);
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983); Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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In 1991, Congress responded to Price Waterhouse and other decisions
by amending Title VII.58 Importantly, the 1991 amendments do not mimic
tort common law. Congress inserted language in Title VII to clarify that a
plaintiff may prevail under Title VII if she establishes that a protected trait
was a “motivating factor” for a decision, and the employer may establish a
defense only if it shows it would have made the same decision absent a
protected trait.59 Congress also amended Title VII’s disparate impact
provisions, and these amendments also do not mimic tort law.60
Price Waterhouse foreshadowed the importance of tort law in the
employment discrimination context, but the immediate period after Price
Waterhouse did not witness the extensive use of tort principles.61 During
this time period, the Supreme Court decided many important cases without
relying on tort law. In recognizing disparate impact under the ADEA, the
Court relied on Title VII case law, the text of the ADEA, and EEOC
regulations.62 The Court clarified the causal standard required for Title VII
and ADEA disparate impact cases without using tort law.63 The Court
discussed causal connections in the ADEA by stating that age had to play a
“determinative” role in the outcome of the case.64 Even when the Court
held that an adverse action in a retaliation context had to be something that
would dissuade a reasonable person from complaining, it did not invoke
tort law for the reasonable person standard.65 During this period, when the
58. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; see also Landgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 250–51 (1994) (stating that “[t]he 1991 [Civil Rights] Act is in large
part a response to a series of decisions of this Court,” including Price Waterhouse).
59. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)) (codifying
the “motivating factor” criterion); id. § 107(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B))
(establishing the employer’s defense).
60. Id. § 105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)). See generally Smith v. City of
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). In 1991, Congress also provided enhanced remedies under Title
VII and these could be characterized as tort-like. However, Title VII narrowly defines
compensatory damages and has a cap on total compensatory damages and punitive damages that is
not tied to harm, but rather to the size of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)–(b). Further, Title
VII’s back pay provision has been characterized as deriving from contract. Those who argue that
enhanced damages make Title VII more tort-like would also need to consider whether the lack of
these damages in the ADEA context makes that statute less like a tort.
61. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991) (using the term “but for,” but
failing to clarify whether the term is being used in its tort sense).
62. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233–40. In this case, a concurrence by Justice O’Connor indicated that
the words “because of” in the ADEA context meant intent or motive. Id. at 249 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
63. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 95–96 (2008); Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656–57 (1989), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074–75 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)), as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
64. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000) (quoting Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68–70 (2006).
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Court invoked tort law, it often rejected portions of tort analysis and argued
that “common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particulars
to Title VII.”66
Two tax cases during this period also rejected tort labels. In United
States v. Burke, the Supreme Court held that the remedies available in Title
VII cases prior to 1991 did not reflect tort-like ideas of injury and
remedy.67 In a concurring opinion, Justice David Souter noted that there
are reasons to both place Title VII within and also to exclude it from the
realm of torts.68 He noted that discrimination causes a tort-like dignitary
harm, but argued that the primary remedy of back pay is contractual in
nature and that Title VII’s ban on discrimination is an implied contractual
term in employment relationships.69 Justices O’Connor and Clarence
Thomas dissented, arguing that even though Title VII did not have tort-like
remedies, its purposes and operation are like those of tort law.70 Burke’s
rejection of tort law was a narrow one because the Court noted that the
1991 amendments to Title VII evinced more tort-like remedies.71
In Commissioner v. Schleier, the Court reasoned that the ADEA is not
“based upon tort or tort type rights” because it does not provide a
comprehensive remedies structure.72 Justice O’Connor and two other
Justices dissented in Schleier, arguing that the ADEA results in a personal
injury, as that term is defined for tax purposes.73 Justice O’Connor
compared the ADEA to a defamation tort claim and noted that the
availability of a jury trial and liquidated damages makes the ADEA tortlike.74
66. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 544–45 (1999) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing tort law with
respect to punitive damages). In some cases, references to tort sources are not used to imbue the
statute with tort law. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (1998) (quoting a torts treatise
for the idea that medical professionals can deviate from a consensus view). The Supreme Court has
also applied tort reasoning to other federal employment statutes. See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v.
Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994).
67. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241 (1992), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755,
1838 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 104 (2006)); see also Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323,
330–31, 336 (1995) (holding that certain ADEA damages are independent of personal injury
damages), superseded by statute on other grounds, Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996
§ 1605.
68. Burke, 504 U.S. at 246–48 (Souter, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 247–48.
70. Id. at 248–49 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 241 n.12 (majority opinion).
72. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 336 (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (2013)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
73. Id. at 342–43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 341–43.
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Outside of Price Waterhouse, the most robust use of the common law
during this period came in cases that dealt with agency principles and
statutory coverage.75 In Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells,
the Court noted that when a statute uses a word with a settled meaning at
common law, then the Court would use the common law to fill any gaps in
meaning.76 The Court then referred to common law master-servant law to
help resolve the case, even though the type of entity at issue in the case, the
professional corporation, did not exist at the common law.77 Clackamas is
typical of the cases during this period as its holding does not adopt the
common law wholesale. Rather, the Court used the common law to justify
applying a test created by the EEOC, a test that does not mimic the
common law in all respects.78
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton79 and Burlington Industries v.
Ellerth,80 the Supreme Court decided when employers would be liable for
the actions of agents in harassment cases. The Court repeatedly relied on
agency principles applicable to tort claims.81 However, neither opinion
discussed why the Court applied tort law agency principles to
discrimination claims, other than noting that Title VII uses the term
“agent.”82 Further, these cases balance agency considerations with what the
Court claimed are limits imposed by Title VII.83 As discussed in more
detail later, the Court created a new law of agency for Title VII harassment
cases that does not mimic agency law applied in tort cases.84
75. Some may argue that the use of a reasonable person standard in harassment cases is tortlike, but reasonableness is used to define the severity of the harm and considers the reasonable
person’s perception of harm, see Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993), unlike the
tort concept of a reasonable person, which determines the standard of care the defendant owes the
plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3
(2010). The Supreme Court did not invoke tort law when defining sexual harassment to contain a
reasonable person test, and the factors the Court directs lower courts to consider in defining when a
reasonable person would objectively encounter harm are different than how the reasonable person
test is conceived in the common law. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22. Further, the reasonable person
standard is also used in criminal law and in contracts.
76. Clackamas, 538 U.S. 440, 447 (2003). In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, the Court
used the common law of remedies and agency and cited the restatements of torts and agency relating
to punitive damages and vicarious liability, respectively. 527 U.S. 526, 537–38, 542–44 (1999).
The Court also created a hybrid legal doctrine that does not rely purely on tort or agency law. Id. at
545–46.
77. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 447–48.
78. Id. at 448–51.
79. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
80. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
81. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–94, 796–97, 801–02; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755–60; see also
Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 542–45; Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1346 (10th Cir. 1990)
(using tort principles of vicarious liability to assess defendant–employer’s liability for Title VII
hostile-work-environment sexual harassment).
82. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791–92.
83. See, e.g., id. at 792.
84. See infra notes 272–76 and accompanying text.
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Faragher and Ellerth made several references to tort law. Faragher
held that an employer will be liable for coworker harassment if the
employer is negligent in allowing the conduct to occur.85 It indicated that
one objective of Title VII is to make an individual whole.86 In Ellerth, the
Court discussed workplace tortfeasors and the concept of avoidable
consequences.87 Despite the references to tort law, the doctrine created in
Faragher and Ellerth is not tort law. Rather, it is a hybrid of agency law,
tort law, prior case law in discrimination cases, and Title VII remedies
principles.
C. The Modern Cases: 2009 to Present
Three opinions during this time period show a change in the way that
tort law is invoked in discrimination cases: Gross v. FBL Financial
Services,88 Staub v. Proctor Hospital,89 and University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar.90 In these three cases, the use of
tort law commands a majority of the Court. The use of tort law is also tied
to textual claims, where certain words or concepts in discrimination law
are directly interpreted through the lens of tort law.
In Gross, the Court held that the ADEA required a showing of “but for”
cause.91 In so holding, the Court rejected the idea that the ADEA should
use the same causal standard as Title VII. After rejecting the Title VII
causal standard, the Justices were faced with a choice. What should the
ADEA’s causal standard be? For the majority opinion, the answer was
simple. The words “because of” mean “but for” cause.92 In support of this
proposition, Justice Thomas cited two cases outside the employment
discrimination context as well as a torts treatise.93 Just like Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse,94 Justice Thomas did not
explain why citing a torts treatise was appropriate. To reach this holding,
Justice Thomas was required to ignore a prior Supreme Court case that
85. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08.
86. Id. at 805–06.
87. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760, 764 (1998); see also Pa. State Police v.
Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146 (2004) (noting Faragher’s and Ellerth’s use of the doctrine of avoidable
consequences). Importantly, in an earlier decision, the Court noted that the avoidable consequences
doctrine is a general principle of remedies in both the torts and contracts contexts. Ford Motor Co.
v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 & n.15 (1982).
88. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
89. 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).
90. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
91. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. See id. at 2350.
93. Id. (citing Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639, 653–54 (2008) and
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63–64 & n.14 (2007)).
94. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 3

1064

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

suggested a different conclusion.95 Importantly, the opinion ignored that
tort common law provides more than one factual cause standard.
The Gross decision is also notably different than O’Connor’s
concurrence in Price Waterhouse. It is strongly textual and purports to rely
on the plain meaning of the words “because of.”96 The opinion did not
grapple with whether the “but for” standard furthers the goals of the
ADEA.97 The opinion also stated that the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving “but for” cause because this is the typical way burdens are
allocated in litigation.98 If Congress wanted to upset this typical allocation,
it is required to explicitly do so.99 This statement is strange given that Price
Waterhouse allocated burdens differently without an express statutory
provision and that tort law also allows for burdens to be allocated
differently in some scenarios.
The Supreme Court also invoked common law tort principles in Staub
v. Proctor Hospital, in which the Court interpreted the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) as containing a
proximate cause element, even though the statute does not use the term
“proximate cause.”100 The Court’s short analysis began with the statement:
“[W]e start from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it
adopts the background of general tort law.”101
Staub used two common law ideas: intent and proximate cause. The
Court noted that intent requires a person to intend the consequences of his
actions or believe that consequences are substantially certain to occur.102
The Court also cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts and cases that
relied on common law proximate cause arguments to define proximate
cause in the USERRA context.103 Lower courts have applied and are likely
to keep applying this reasoning in the Title VII context because in the
95. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351–52 (indicating that Price Waterhouse should not be extended to
the ADEA because the current Supreme Court Justices may not resolve the question the same way
and because its framework is unworkable).
96. See id. at 2350 (defining the phrase by referring to 1 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 194 (1966), 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 746 (1933), and THE
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 132 (1966)).
97. Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that “but for” cause is problematic in cases involving
motives rather than physical forces. Id. at 2358–59 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He also recognized that
the defendant is in the better position to understand why an employment decision is made. Id. at
2359.
98. Id. at 2351 (majority opinion).
99. Id.
100. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190–92 (2011).
101. Id. at 1191.
102. Id. at 1191, 1192 & n.2.
103. Id. at 1192 & n.2 (citing Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of N.Y., 130 S. Ct. 983, 989 (2010),
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 704 (2005), and Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517
U.S. 830, 837 (1996)).
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Staub decision, the Supreme Court emphasized the similarities between
USERRA and Title VII.104
The Staub case has been particularly effective at connecting tort law
and employment law. In 2011, the EEOC issued regulations about how
disparate impact claims would proceed under the ADEA. The EEOC cited
Staub as a basis for importing tort principles into this analysis.105 The
EEOC cryptically noted that it was not adopting tort law wholesale, but
using it for guidance.106 It then cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts for
the propositions that greater care should be exercised if greater harm
exists107 and “whether an employer knew or reasonably should have known
of measures that would reduce harm informs the reasonableness of the
employer’s choices.”108
The Nassar case continued this trend. In that case, the Court determined
whether a plaintiff proceeding on a Title VII retaliation claim is required to
establish “but for” cause.109 As with Gross, the opinion partially relied on
the complex relationship between past Supreme Court precedents and the
1991 amendments to Title VII.110 However, this does not detract from the
importance of the role of torts in this case. Once the Court decides not to
follow Price Waterhouse and the 1991 amendments to Title VII, it must
make a choice regarding what the causation standard should be. The choice
the Court makes—“but for” cause—is largely driven by the majority
opinion’s narrow view of tort law and by Gross, which also relied on tort
law.111
Nassar invoked tort law from the beginning of the opinion, defining the
case as one involving causation and then noting that causation inquiries
most commonly arise in tort cases.112 The majority engaged in a lengthy
discussion of causation’s role in tort law, with numerous citations to the

104. Id. at 1191; Davis v. Omni-Care, Inc., No. 10-3806, 2012 WL 1959367, at *109 & n.8
(6th Cir. June 1, 2012); Jajeh v. Cnty. of Cook, 678 F.3d 560, 572 (7th Cir. 2012).
105. Disparate Impact and Reasonable Factors Other Than Age Under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 19,080, 19083 (Mar. 30, 2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1625) [hereinafter EEOC Regulations].
106. Id.
107. Id. at 19089 & n.71 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 298 cmt. b (1965) for
the proposition that “[t]he greater the danger, the greater the care which must be exercised”).
108. Id. at 19089–90, 19090 n.73 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292 cmt. c
(1965) for the proposition that “[i]f the actor can advance or protect his interest as adequately by
other conduct which involves less risk of harm to others, the risk contained in his conduct is clearly
unreasonable”).
109. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522–23 (2013).
110. See id. at 2525–28; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348–50 (2009).
111. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525–28, 2534; Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350.
112. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 3

1066

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

Restatement and a torts treatise.113
The Court indicated that “textbook tort law” requires “but for” cause.114
As discussed throughout this Article, this is a woefully inaccurate account
of tort law, which allows for substantial cause as an option in multiple
sufficient cause cases. The Court noted the possibility of multiple
sufficient causes, indicated that these cases are rare in tort law, and then
failed to explain why retaliation claims would always require “but for”
cause.115
The Court’s use of the Restatement to justify the “but for” standard is
especially problematic. The Court cited Restatement of Torts § 431,
Comment a (negligence), to support “but for” cause.116 However, the First
Restatement uses a substantial factor formulation to define cause.117 This
Restatement reflects a different view of causation than the way it would be
conceived now. During this time, the question of legal cause combined
ideas of proximate cause and factual cause. The Court also used
Restatement sections that apply to negligence claims, even though the
Court has characterized disparate treatment law as requiring intent.118 The
Court cited the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm, even though that Restatement did not exist when
Congress created Title VII’s retaliation provision.119
Unlike Gross, the Nassar decision did try to grapple with some policy
implications of the choice of causal standards. The Court chose “but for”
cause because it claimed that lessening the standard would lead to
frivolous claims.120 The “but for” standard is being invoked for reasons of
judicial administration and to purposefully tilt the law in a particular
direction.
Together Staub, Gross, and Nassar represent a shift in the way the
Supreme Court uses tort law. A reliable majority of Justices are
comfortable using tort law without much additional argument about why
tort law is appropriate. Tort law is no longer just persuasive authority that
serves as one source of potential meaning in discrimination cases. Rather,
the Justices can use tort law to find a specific meaning to particular
statutory words or ideas. This Article does not argue that this shift happens
113. Id. at 2524–25 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 & cmt. b (2010), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(1) (1965), and W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)).
114. Id. at 2525.
115. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 27 & cmt. b (2010)).
116. Id.
117. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 431 (1934).
118. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(1) (1965)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2531–32.
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in all cases, but rather that the trend is toward a more automatic and robust
use of tort law.121 Further, this move to tort law is also occurring at the
same time the Supreme Court is eschewing modes of pragmatic reasoning
in favor of textual arguments.122 Thus, the story of the tort label is
entwined with the rise of textualism.
Although this Article focuses on the way the Supreme Court has used
tort law, the lower courts also label discrimination statutes as torts123 and
apply common law tort reasoning to them.124 Scholars and the EEOC also
refer to the statutes as torts and use common law reasoning.125 Courts have
repeatedly claimed that employment discrimination statutes are torts
explicitly, in dicta, or implicitly by referring to common law tort
concepts.126 Unfortunately, they have not explained what it means for the
statutes to be torts.127

121. This Article does not argue that tort reasoning is required to reach the results in each of
these cases. This section makes a descriptive claim about how the Court invokes tort law.
122. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (reasoning that a rise in textualist statutory interpretation promotes
consistency in the judicial decision-making process).
123. See, e.g., Wanchik v. Great Lakes Health Plan, Inc., 6 F. App’x 252, 261 (6th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Fenton v. HiSAN, Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 829 (6th Cir. 1999)) (calling Title VII a “statutory
tort”); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1250 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying tort
doctrine of avoidable consequences); Nolan v. Duffy Connors LLP, 542 F. Supp. 2d 429, 433–
34 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (discussing Title VII and the ADEA in concluding that the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act “creates statutory torts that cover the same types of harms as its federal cousins”). But
see EEOC v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 844–45 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Title VII is not a
fault-based tort scheme. Title VII is aimed at the consequences or effects of an employment practice
and not at the . . . motivation of co-workers or employers.” (alterations in original) (quoting Ellison
v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Vulcan Soc’y, Inc., 897 F.2d 30, 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
125. See, e.g., EEOC Regulations, supra note 105, at 19083; John C.P. Goldberg, The
Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs,
115 YALE L.J. 524, 597 (2005); Michael J. Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile
Environment Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 437, 519–20 (2002); Mark C. Weber, Beyond
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed Motive Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. REV.
495, 538 (1990).
126. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.10 (1974) (“An action to redress racial
discrimination may also be likened to an action for defamation or intentional infliction of mental
distress. Indeed, the contours of the latter tort are still developing, and it has been suggested that
‘under the logic of the common law development of a law of insult and indignity, racial
discrimination might be treated as a dignitary tort.’” (quoting CHARLES O. GREGORY & HARRY
KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 961 (2d ed. 1969))); see also Comm’r v. Schleier,
515 U.S. 323, 333 (1995) (accepting for sake of argument that an ADEA claim is a tort claim or a
tort-type claim); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 254 (1992) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(referring to Title VII as a “tort-like cause of action”); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 683 (1983) (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (referring to “but for” causation)); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) (referring to “but for” causation).
127. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (declaring that Title
VII defines wrongs that are a kind of tort without providing any supporting explanation).
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II. THE AT-WILL EXCEPTION AND PRECEDENT PROBLEMS
The prior Part shows how modern Supreme Court cases use tort law in
discrimination cases. The following sections detail serious mistakes in this
statutory analysis. This Part discusses how the Supreme Court fails to
consider that the discrimination statutes’ status as an exception to at-will
employment affects the use of tort common law. The Supreme Court also
does not grapple with the fact that the first decades of statutory analysis did
not occur through the lens of tort law.
Let’s assume that a court wants to discover the meaning of the term
“because of” under a discrimination statute. Even if the court characterizes
the statute as a tort, the automatic use of tort law would never be
appropriate. This is because federal discrimination law created a large
exception to prior common law norms about the employment relationship.
At common law, the employment relationship is defined by the concept
of at-will employment. Absent a contract or contrary law, at-will
employment allows an employer to hire, fire, or change the conditions of
employment for any reason or no reason.128 Many states have developed
their own exceptions to at-will employment.129 In most states, without the
existence of federal employment discrimination laws or a corollary state
statute, the common law would allow the employer to terminate an
individual based on a protected trait, such as sex or race.130 The
employment discrimination statutes created large exceptions to common
law notions of at-will employment.131 Any analysis that purports to
integrate common law principles with the discrimination statutes must
recognize and account for this foundational aspect of the discrimination
statutes. This central aspect of discrimination law weighs strongly against
the use of the common law as the automatic and primary source of
statutory meaning.
When courts are faced with a question about the meaning of a particular
word or concept in a discrimination statute, before applying tort common
law, the court must first consider whether Congress’s rejection of portions
of the common law affects the intersection of tort law and discrimination
law. Failure to do this represents a gross misunderstanding about the
intersection of federal discrimination law and the common law. It is
128. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 604 (9th ed. 2009).
129. See Employment At-Will Exceptions by State, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-exceptions
-by-state.aspx (last visited June 26, 2014) (providing a list of states with corresponding at-will
employment exceptions). For example, Montana has a statute that abrogates, in part, the at-will
doctrine regarding certain terminations. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (2013).
130. Howard v. Wolff Broad. Corp., 611 So. 2d 307, 312–13 (Ala. 1992).
131. Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 2, at 70 (discussing how Title VII abrogates common law
understandings of employment).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/3

18

Sperino: The Tort Label

2014]

THE TORT LABEL

1069

absolutely clear that the discrimination statutes do not call for a wholesale
use of the common law because to do so would eradicate the statutes’ main
protections. This key fact creates difficult interpretive questions if one
assumes tort common law should apply to discrimination statutes. If
Congress meant to alter the common law relationship in a significant way,
did it also mean to fully retain common law meanings for core statutory
words? If so, which words and concepts retained their common law
meanings and how are these meanings changed by the limits Congress
imposed on employers’ ability to make decisions based on protected traits?
Staub, Gross, and Nassar all fail to make this key inquiry. In Staub, the
Court failed to ask whether Congress’s creation of an antidiscrimination
exception to the common law altered whether the Court should apply
proximate cause to the statute at all, or created a different version of
proximate cause that is not coterminous with the common law.132 It also
failed to consider whether common law ideas of intent are appropriate in
the discrimination context.133 In Gross and Nassar, the Court failed to
consider whether the factual cause inquiry should be different in
discrimination cases because the ADEA and Title VII reject portions of the
common law.134
Indeed, there are certain pockets of antidiscrimination obligation that
are so contrary to tort law that it is difficult to imagine how using tort law
would be doctrinally or theoretically satisfying. Consider, for example,
religious or disability accommodation. It is difficult to conceive how tort
principles developed in the context of strict liability, negligence, or
intentional torts could be applied wholesale to these claims. Both religious
and disability accommodation cases require affirmative conduct by the
employer that is unlike duties tort law imposes on employers. In the
disability context, employers are required to engage in an interactive
process to assist the employee in developing a work environment that
reasonably accommodates the employee’s disability. These claims are so
different from tort law that their very existence undermines the argument
that the discrimination statutes are torts.
Another interpretive issue arises from the fact that the Supreme Court
did not typically invoke tort law in early discrimination cases. The
disparate impact theory and its elements are not derived from tort law. The
multi-step McDonnell Douglas test135 does not stem from tort law. The
plurality in Price Waterhouse rejected traditional common law

132. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191–92 (2011); see also id. at 1193–94.
133. See id. at 1191–92.
134. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350–51 (2009); Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
135. For an articulation of the test, see supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text.
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formulations of cause and imposed a two-tiered analysis.136 Any later
attempts to imbue the discrimination statutes with a torts sensibility must
contend with foundational opinions not grounded in tort doctrine or theory.
Recent attempts to force discrimination statutes into a torts mold are
awkward because they ignore that the foundational cases in discrimination
law are not based in tort law.
III. INTERPRETIVE DILEMMAS
Let’s assume that courts could overcome the difficulties discussed in
the prior section and find that certain statutory terms or concepts are not
affected by discrimination statutes’ relationship with the common law or
prior precedent. Even then, it is still hard to equate discrimination terms
and concepts with common law analogs. Discrimination statutes’ text and
architecture do not mimic common law torts, and discrimination concepts
do not map onto tort concepts well. The Court also has failed to recognize
the relational nature of tort concepts—that the meaning of words are not
static, but rather depend on the surrounding elements of the tort.
A. The Language and Structure Problem
Neither the language nor the structure of discrimination statutes mimics
tort law. The discrimination statutes do not use tort terms of art. The main
operative provisions of Title VII and the ADEA do not use the words
intent, factual cause, proximate cause, or damages, which are key words
used in tort causes of action. Congress has used these terms of art in other
statutes and thus knows how to specifically invoke tort principles when it
wants to do so.137
Even the words “because of” are, at best, an ambiguous reference to tort
law. Tort causes of action typically do not define causation inquiries using
the term “because of.”138 Thus, when Congress used the words “because
of,” it is textually possible that Congress did not intend a common law
meaning.
The discrimination statutes are not structured like the elements of
traditional torts. Tort law has developed a preference for a small set of
central elements that define each cause of action. Take, for example, the
traditional articulation of the elements of negligence as a breach of a duty

136. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
137. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (2006) (providing that plaintiffs may recover damages in
excess of prescribed caps if a showing of proximate cause is made); Federal Employees’
Compensation Act, ch. 458, 39 Stat. 742–43 (1916) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 8102
(2006)) (providing that the United States shall not be liable to an injured employee whose
“intoxication . . . is the proximate cause of the injury”).
138. See, e.g., Taylor v. Fishkind, 51 A.3d 743, 759 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012).
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that causes damages.139 The original operative language of Title VII is
divided into two core provisions, which are facially more complex than the
elements of tort claims.140 As discussed in more detail below, Title VII is
further complicated by the 1991 amendments to the statute, in which
Congress added additional language regarding disparate impact claims and
further defined the causal inquiry.141
There are numerous instances where Congress could have easily chosen
language to mimic traditional tort law, but did not. In 1991, when Congress
amended Title VII to make it clear that plaintiffs were not initially required
to establish “but for” causation, Congress chose to define the plaintiff’s
burden as establishing that the plaintiff’s protected trait played a
“motivating factor” in the employment decision.142 This motivating factor
language is different than the substantial factor language used at the
common law.143 The affirmative defense that Congress approved for
motivating factor cases is a limited affirmative defense for damages, rather
than liability.144 When Congress defined compensatory damages under
Title VII, it provided a narrower definition of these damages than that
imposed by common law.145 The damages provision for the ADEA, which
is modeled from the Fair Labor Standards Act,146 provides only limited
remedies and not the full panoply of damages that would be available at
common law.147
Likewise, the defenses available for discrimination cases do not mimic
the common law. Congress provided instances where the employer would
be excused from liability, even when conduct might otherwise appear to be
discriminatory. For example, an employer may escape liability under Title
VII if a protected trait is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).148
An employer may implement bona fide seniority systems.149 Under the
ADEA, an employer may make age-based employment decisions for
certain executives and policymakers.150 Given these provisions, it is odd to
assume that provisions in the discrimination statutes are coterminous with
tort law.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 71 (2014).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
See supra Part I.B (discussing 1991 amendments).
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
See, e.g., Taylor, 51 A.3d at 759.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2).
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1).
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The substantial number of statutory provisions that do not mimic tort
common law raises another challenge to textual tort analysis. The Supreme
Court does not consider how these non-tort provisions affect the claim that
some words nonetheless retain a tort meaning.
B. The Mapping Problem
For purposes of this section, assume that the tort universe consists of
three kinds of torts—intentional, negligence, and strict liability—that these
torts are defined by their core elements, that these torts remain unchanged
by statutory torts, and that these torts are concerned with limited types of
harm. For lack of a better terminology, this section refers to such a view of
tort law as a traditional view. Even if we artificially limit tort law to these
contours, it still proves unsatisfactory in answering discrimination
questions. Discrimination law’s analytical frameworks do not have direct
analogs in tort law.
The Supreme Court has described different frameworks for analyzing
discrimination cases, which the courts divide into two broad categories:
disparate treatment and disparate impact.151 Disparate treatment cases are
further subdivided into individual disparate treatment, harassment, and
pattern or practice cases.152
Within the individual disparate treatment category, some courts further
subdivide cases into direct evidence and circumstantial evidence cases.153
The courts also often categorize individual disparate treatment cases as
either single-motive or mixed-motive.154 Cases that involve explicitly
discriminatory policies or conduct are called direct evidence cases and are
analyzed under a fairly simple formulation, requiring a plaintiff to establish
that a decision was taken because of a protected trait.155
151. See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and
the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1368 (2009) (“Few
propositions are less controversial or more embedded in the structure of Title VII analysis than that
the statute recognizes only ‘disparate treatment’ and ‘disparate impact’ theories of employment
discrimination.” (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993))).
152. Id. at 1414 (discussing the subdivision into individual disparate treatment and harassment
cases); accord Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348–49 (1977) (discussing
Congress’s proscription of discriminatory policies or practices).
153. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (explaining that
when direct evidence of discrimination is available, the burden-shifting framework articulated in
McDonnell Douglas does not apply); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 & n.44 (explaining that direct
evidence is not required under the McDonnell Douglas framework).
154. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989). The author strongly disagrees
with the way courts characterize discrimination claims. These paragraphs are meant to be
descriptive only.
155. See, e.g., Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2000) (indicating
that a company policy of discrimination constitutes direct evidence).
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Plaintiffs who do not have direct evidence and who allege
discrimination was the cause of their harm often proceed through the threepart McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.156 So-called Title VII
mixed-motive cases, which involve claims where both legitimate and
discriminatory reasons caused an action, are analyzed using the statutory
language added in the 1991 amendments.157 Harassment cases are analyzed
under a multiple-part framework developed by the courts.158 The plaintiff
must prove the harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working
environment.”159 Pattern or practices cases usually involve claims by
numerous individuals that the defendant had an actual policy of
discrimination or that its conduct demonstrated that discrimination was the
norm.160
Outside of the intentional discrimination context, courts have
recognized disparate impact claims. Disparate impact occurs when a
specific employment practice creates a disproportionate impact on a
protected group unless the defendant can prove an affirmative defense,
which differs by statutory regime. Under Title VII, the defendant can
prevail if it can demonstrate that the practice is job-related and consistent
with business necessity.161 Under the ADEA, the defendant can prevail if it
demonstrates that the practice was based on a reasonable factor other than
age (RFOA).162
To apply common law tort principles to discrimination law, it is
necessary to determine whether discrimination law mimics a traditional
tort pocket of obligation. This is because common law torts vary markedly
in the interests they protect and their underlying goals. None of the
traditionally recognized discrimination types maps well onto traditional
torts.
156. See, e.g., Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2011). This is not always
the case. See, e.g., Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2009) (allowing
a plaintiff to make a case of discrimination without resorting to McDonnell Douglas if the plaintiff
has “either direct or circumstantial evidence that supports an inference of intentional
discrimination”); Taylor v. Peerless Indus. Inc., 322 F. App’x 355, 360 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying a
modified McDonnell Douglas framework).
157. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009). The Supreme Court
held that “but-for” cause is required under the ADEA. Id. at 2352. This question has not been
definitively resolved in the ADA context.
158. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–67 (1986).
159. Id. at 67 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348–49 (1977).
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). A plaintiff can also prevail in a disparate
impact case under Title VII if it can demonstrate that the employer could have used alternate
business practices that would not have resulted in the disparity. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). This
option is not available under the ADEA. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005).
162. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 91 (2008); see also id. at 92–93.
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First, consider disparate treatment law. It could plausibly be argued that
disparate treatment cases are like intentional torts because both require the
establishment of intent. However, this comparison is only true in a general
sense because it ignores two important factors: whether individual
disparate treatment cases actually require a showing of intent and whether
the intent required is similar to the type required in intentional tort cases.
Describing the intent necessary for traditional common law intentional
torts is not an easy task. However, it is possible to rely on rudimentary
descriptions of this intent to show the difficulty of importing the common
law into employment discrimination cases. Common law intent is often
described as being concerned with the subjective state of the actor, which
is ascertained from the available evidence. The defendant is liable if he
engaged in a volitional act that he knew or with a substantial certainty
knew would cause interference with other people or property.163 Some torts
impose a higher intent requirement, essentially requiring something like
mens rea.164 Importantly, tort law offers numerous options regarding how
intent can be defined.
Scholars disagree on whether disparate treatment cases require a
showing of intent, both as a descriptive and a normative matter.165 Even if
it is possible to say that, as a descriptive matter, courts require plaintiffs to
establish intent in disparate treatment cases, this intent standard is itself
inconsistent. When some courts describe intent, they describe it as
requiring animus,166 which seems more akin to the higher mens rea-like
requirement imposed for a few intentional torts. However, it appears that
the courts have largely rejected an argument that the defendant could be
liable for intentional discrimination if it knew with substantial certainty
that its actions were causing differential treatment based on a protected
trait.167 Thus, the current concept of intent in employment discrimination
cases fits uncomfortably within traditional tort descriptions of intent.

163. Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093–94 (Wash. 1955). The exact articulation of intent
varies depending on the intentional tort at issue.
164. Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What Tort Concepts Reveal
About Goals, Results, and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 259, 278–79 (2008).
165. See, e.g., id. at 270–71; David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 899, 919–20 (1993); Stacey E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved
with Good Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1141, 1145 (2007); Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate
Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107, 1118, 1136–37 (1991). See generally Rebecca
Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor
Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495 (2001) (analyzing the intent requirement in the
context of both vertical and horizontal decision-making processes).
166. See, e.g., Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1189, 1191–92 (2011).
167. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552–56 (2011).
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It is at least possible to state that most intentional discrimination cases,
at least descriptively, are not negligence cases. To date, the courts have not
embraced arguments that plaintiffs may establish a discrimination claim
via a negligence analysis.168 Despite this, courts have used the tort label to
apply negligence-based concepts to the discrimination statutes, failing to
recognize that such concepts may not fit well if discrimination law is not
perceived as a negligence regime.169
Disparate impact shares traits with strict liability and negligence,
depending on how the plaintiff would prevail in a given suit.170 In some
cases, a plaintiff may prevail by establishing a particular employment
practice created a large disparity based on a protected trait, if the employer
is not able to establish an affirmative defense to liability.171 In Title VII
cases, the defendant may prevail by showing that its practice was jobrelated and consistent with business necessity.172 The defendant is liable
whether or not it intended to create the disparity, and even if it took
reasonable measures to try to prevent it. Thus, these cases share
commonalities with strict liability. In Title VII cases, a plaintiff may also
prevail by establishing that the employer could have adopted alternate
practices that would not result in a disparity, but chose not to do so.173
These cases sound more like negligence as the employer is being held
liable for its failure to take reasonable care to prevent disparate results.174
Even though disparate impact might share some traits with traditional
torts, the analogy is still inapt. The substantive standard requires the
plaintiff to identify the specific employment practice at issue and that

168. See, e.g., Aaron v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 3:08CV1471, 2009 WL 803586, at *2
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2009) (“He also alleges Defendant was merely ‘negligent’ in its hiring
practices, which does not rise to the standard of intentional discrimination required by Title VII.”);
Jalal v. Columbia Univ., 4 F. Supp. 2d 224, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Title VII, however, provides no
remedy for negligent discrimination . . . .”). See generally Oppenheimer, supra note 165 (arguing
that negligent discrimination should form the basis of an action under Title VII). Courts do
recognize employer liability for negligence where the employer has failed to take action to prevent
or correct harassment; however, that liability depends on there first being a showing of harassment.
See, e.g., Zarazed v. Spar Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-2621, 2006 WL 224050, at *7 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 27, 2006). For an interesting discussion of how Title VII already incorporates a negligence
standard, see Zatz, supra note 151, at 1364.
169. See Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191–92. See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination
Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1.
170. Oppenheimer, supra note 165, at 931–36.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
172. Id.
173. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
174. Oppenheimer, supra note 165, at 931–36.
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practice must be tied to a specific kind of outcome.175 Further, courts
require significant statistical proof regarding disparity based on a protected
trait.176 Even if disparate impact could be analogized to certain kinds of
torts, it is not proven like a traditional tort. Further, disparate impact is
imbued with court judgments about how discrimination happens and how
employers should be liable for societal discrimination.
Discrimination claims are also an imperfect fit with traditional torts
because of the kinds of harms that are protected at common law.
Discrimination claims outside of the harassment context often do not
involve physical injury.177 Indeed, it is difficult to define the harms of
discrimination in a singular way. The harms of discrimination are often
economic in nature but also involve harms to personal dignity, equality
norms, and group harms. As Professor Martha Chamallas has noted, “such
claims often articulate a type of injury—disproportionately experienced by
members of subordinated groups—that cannot be pinned down as
psychological, economic, or physical in nature, or as either individual or
group based.”178 The “multidimensional quality of the harm” in harassment
cases “defies categorization under traditional headings” and makes it
problematic to map traditional tort causes of action onto discrimination.179
Statutes also impose accommodation duties.180 For example, an
employer is required to accommodate certain religious beliefs and
practices.181 Under the ADA, employers also are required to accommodate
employees with disabilities.182 Accommodation law is perhaps the farthest
from the common law given its affirmative obligations not only to avoid
harm but also to alter environments and policies.
It is difficult to argue that specific words in the discrimination statutes
have tort meaning when the ways plaintiffs prove discrimination claims
and the ways employers defend these claims do not map well onto any tort
cause of action. There is no way of proving discrimination claims that fully
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Under Title VII, a plaintiff may allege that combined
practices created a disparate impact if the plaintiff can show that the practices are not capable of
separation. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
176. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 933 F.2d 1140, 1146 (2d Cir. 1991)
(noting the rule that statistical evidence must reveal “a disparity so great that it cannot reasonably be
attributed to chance”).
177. Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort
Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2140 (2007).
178. Id. at 2147.
179. Id. at 2146–47.
180. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79–81, 83 n.14 (1977) (discussing
the employer’s obligation under Title VII to make some effort to accommodate an employee’s
religious beliefs in certain circumstances).
181. Id.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2006) (defining discrimination under the ADA as a failure to
provide reasonable accommodations).
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mimics an intentional tort, a strict liability tort, or a negligence tort.
Disparate impact claims and accommodation claims are so far outside the
realm of traditional torts that their presence within the discrimination
canon is a sharp rebuke to the claim that the discrimination statutes are
common law torts. As one commentator noted in the criminal law context:
Principles of legal reasoning and jurisprudential legitimacy
counsel that the use of analogy and precedent in judicial
decisions be grounded in reasoning that is by some measure a
“fit” with the matter before the Court. This imperative, and
the companion norm that some explanation be provided to
justify reliance on indirectly applicable legal authority, is only
enhanced when a court draws from outside the immediate
doctrinal domain in which a case dwells.183
Simply put, the automatic application of tort law to the core substantive
provisions of the discrimination statutes is not appropriate because
discrimination claims share no direct analog to any traditional tort.
C. The Relational Aspect of Torts
References to general tort law or even references to specific pockets of
tort obligation are unsatisfactory because they fail to recognize the
relational nature of tort doctrine. Tort elements are relational in the sense
that their meaning is not independent but depends on the goals of the
underlying tort and the other elements of the tort claim.
The common law of torts is an evolving doctrine that responds to
different policies and goals, depending on the underlying pocket of
obligation. Core concepts such as duty and fault define how ancillary
doctrines respond. And these ancillary doctrines are often specific to
certain kinds of torts or to specific pockets of obligation. Given these
differences, concepts that apply to one type of tort may not apply at all or
in the same way as the concept would be applied to another type of tort.
This is true even though courts may use the same words to describe the
underlying concepts. Tort causes of action are “like a group of individuals
sharing family resemblances, with remote cousins looking quite different
than siblings.”184
Judge Guido Calabresi evocatively describes this point in the following
passage:

183. Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 703–04 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
184. JOEL LEVIN, TORT WARS 1 (2008) (citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS § 67 (1953)).
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[C]ourts have been able to hold two faulty, independent
hunters both liable in cases like Summers v. Tice, even though
only one of their shots hit the victim and even though a
showing of but for cause was supposedly a prerequisite for
liability. They would not as readily have found two equally
faulty independent rapists to be the fathers of an illegitimate
child—even though the causal evidence as to the wrongdoing
was precisely the same as in Summers v. Tice and even though
the victim was equally innocent. Rightly or wrongly, the
effects (and hence the function) of paternity actions are
conceived to be very different from those of money damage
claims for injuries. What is “cause” for one need not be
“cause” for the other.185
Even when verbal formulations are similar, courts often apply different
standards depending on the underlying conduct and motivations of the
parties.186
Further, over time, courts can cling to the same legal language but
fundamentally reframe the underlying inquiry to change the overall
outcome of cases.187 Professor Suzanna Sherry describes how judges may
change the underlying assumption on which doctrine is based without any
facial recognition of underlying shifts in the law.188
Consider the question of whether to apply a particular causation
standard to a statute. In the employment discrimination context, courts are
considering what type of causation is imbedded in a statute by interpreting
terms such as “because of.” There are several tort standards for causation,
and the importance of causation within tort law varies depending on the
type of tort involved.189 It is impossible to look at generic causal language
185. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 106 (1975) (citations omitted).
186. Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 249, 260 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (describing different factors that
might affect substantive reasonableness standards).
187. MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER,
AND TORT LAW 132–33 (2010) (discussing how courts used the “but-for” causation standard in
wrongful birth cases but reframed the causal inquiry over time to allow plaintiffs to proceed on
claims).
188. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 145,
147, 159–60 (discussing how the Supreme Court uses the term “strict scrutiny” with different
meanings depending on changed facts without recognizing any underlying change in doctrine).
189. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 33 (2010) (discussing how in some jurisdictions proximate cause plays a diminished role in
intentional tort cases); Mark Bartholomew & Patrick F. McArdle, Causing Infringement, 64 VAND.
L. REV. 675, 721–26 (2011) (discussing “but for” and “substantial factor” causal standards); Jill E.
Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 832
(2009) ( “In cases involving fraud . . . . [c]ourts rarely consider proximate cause extensively.”).
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and determine which kind of causation the statute provides because
“[c]ausation issues are colored . . . by issues of responsibility and harm that
connect to it on either side.”190 Any claims that the analysis is a pure tort
analysis should be viewed with suspicion.191
Words in tort law have different meanings given the underlying legal
claim and factual circumstances. “The real explanation has to be completed
in every case from the policies and values underlying the recognition of the
primary duty which is in question.”192 Courts applying the tort label often
fail to see this key point.
For example, in Gross, the Court reasoned that the terms “because of”
means “but for” causation.193 However, the common law actually has a
richer, more nuanced view of causation. While “but for” cause may be the
dominant way of thinking about negligence causation, the substantial
factor test can also be used, including in discrimination cases.194 In other
words, the common law adjusts the causal standard in circumstances where
“but for” causation does not work. Further, the common law allows the
burden of persuasion on causation to shift to the defendant in certain cases
when there are policy or other reasons to make the shift.195 Even in the
narrow context of factual cause, the Supreme Court has numerous choices
to make about which causal standard to impose and upon which party to
impose it. Further, the causal inquiry is not of key importance in
intentional tort cases, where proof of intent lessens the need for a focus on
causation.196 The Supreme Court should at least consider these possibilities
in discrimination cases, where the employer has the best access to
190. David G. Owen, Foreword to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note
186, at 1, 18.
191. Often, concepts in tort law are also relational in the sense that they depend on the
underlying relationship between the parties. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The
Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 707 (2001).
Take for example the duty owed to persons on land. The duty owed depends on whether the person
is a trespasser, an invitee, or a child. See id. at 670 (providing examples of relational concepts). At
times, the necessary relationship is stated in the primary rule, but at other times, a decision maker
would need to understand the entire scope of a rule and its exceptions to understand relational
concepts. Likewise, questions of when a party will be held liable for the actions of others highly
depend on the relationship between the parties.
192. Peter Birks, The Concept of a Civil Wrong, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT
LAW, supra note 186, at 31, 51. Further, tort law often changes, depending on other structures that
support similar goals. The most common of these systems are systems of mandatory or optional
insurance. Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort
Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 27–29 (1980).
193. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
194. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249–50 (1989); see also
Bartholomew & McArdle, supra note 189, at 724–25.
195. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–56 (1981).
196. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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information about its decision-making, where multiple individuals often
make decisions, and where it may be difficult for the plaintiff to tease apart
varying motives for a particular act.
Careful analysis also would require courts to examine whether
Congress has already spoken to the underlying concerns in other ways. To
date, courts have often failed to do this. Rather, when they apply the tort
label, they look narrowly at a particular word used in the common law and
import common law ideas, without considering whether the statute
addresses those same concerns elsewhere. As discussed earlier, modern
statutes are not typically constructed out of the same handful of elements as
traditional tort law. Thus, ideas such as cause and harm can be expressed
throughout statutory regimes and can be addressed in numerous ways that
do not mimic common law articulations of these same ideas. Courts that
fixate on one common law term and thereby import meaning into a statute
risk ignoring congressional expressions related to the underlying concern
expressed throughout a statutory regime.
IV. WHAT TORT LAW IS (AND IS NOT)
When the Supreme Court uses the tort label, it also overestimates the
work that tort law can do in answering statutory questions. Labeling a
statute as a tort does not provide a meaningful answer to most statutory
interpretation questions. This Part describes how the definition of torts, its
theory, and its doctrine do not provide meaningful assistance with statutory
interpretation because they do not provide courts with a workably
determinate set of options or direction on how to choose between conflicts
within those options.197
It does this by showing what tort law is, and importantly, what it is not.
Tort law is an area that coheres around few central concepts and does not
contain a core guiding theoretical principle or principles. Importantly, this
Part discusses why the idea of a general tort law is a fallacy. Even if one
looks to specific tort doctrines or concepts, such as causation, these smaller
units of tort law are relational and thus provide little help in answering
statutory questions.
An example of the type of reasoning this Article contests is the kind
found in the Staub case. In that case the Supreme Court declared: “[W]e
start from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts
the background of general tort law.”198 The Court then cited the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and cases that relied on common law
proximate cause arguments to define proximate cause in the USERRA
197. Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
TORT LAW, supra note 186, at 159, 159–60.
198. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011).
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context.199 In doing so, it ignored the contested definition of proximate
cause, its varying application to different kinds of torts, and its evolution
over time.200
A. The Definition of “Torts”
Tort law can be defined as being “about the wrongs that a private
litigant must establish to entitle her to a court’s assistance in obtaining a
remedy and the remedies that will be made available to her.”201 Another
common definition of a tort is a “civil wrong, other than breach of contract,
for which the court will provide a remedy.”202 A less litigation-centric
definition of torts is that the “law of torts concerns the obligations of
persons living in a crowded society to respect the safety, property, and
personality of their neighbors, both as an a priori matter and as a duty to
compensate for wrongfully cased harm, ex post.”203
Many modern statutes could properly be classified as torts in these
general senses. However, it is important to realize that none of these
definitions are helpful in answering most, if any, statutory interpretation
questions. As Professor Max Radin noted, it is of little value to label a tort
as “something that is actionable but is neither a contract nor a quasicontract.”204 It is necessary to look beyond these general definitions to
determine the central features of tort law.
The torts literature describes five universal and fairly noncontroversial
aspects of tort law. First, tort law is unlike criminal law, in that the remedy
does not include imprisonment and the state is not the actor solely
responsible for prosecuting the action. Second, tort law is a means of social
control that attempts to reduce undesirable conduct. In contrast with some
other forms of social control, tort law accomplishes this goal by “marking
out conduct, or the failure to attain a required standard of conduct, as
wrongful.”205 This aspect is subject to the caveat that, at times,
199. Id. at 1192 & n.2 (citing Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of N.Y., 130 S. Ct. 983, 989 (2010),
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 704 (2005), and Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517
U.S. 830, 837 (1996)).
200. Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1199, 1220,
1234–35 (2013).
201. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 919
(2010). One of the leading torts treatises explains that “a really satisfactory definition of a tort is yet
to be found.” KEETON ET AL., supra note 113, § 1 at 1.
202. KEETON ET AL., supra note 113, § 1 at 2.
203. David G. Owen, Foreword to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note
186, at 7.
204. Max Radin, A Speculative Inquiry into the Nature of Torts, 21 TEX. L. REV. 697, 698–99
(1943).
205. Tony Honoré, The Morality of Tort Law—Questions and Answers, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 186, at 78.
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nonwrongful conduct is discouraged in tort regimes, such as harm-causing
dangerous activities in strict liability or legal activities in nuisance cases.
Third, absent contractual waiver, tort law allows a party access to some
state-sanctioned system (often a court system) to both avert and seek
compensation for tortious conduct.206 Fourth, tort law typically involves an
obligation of a liable defendant to compensate the plaintiff for harm.207
Fifth, tort law often allows for the possible recovery of compensatory
damages.208
Just like the general definitions of tort law, these unifying aspects of
tort law are not helpful in answering most, if any, interpretation questions
related to employment discrimination. These central aspects do not define
the duties owed, the relationships that must exist between parties, or the
defenses that may be used to escape liability. These concepts do not tell us
which parties the law should favor or what interests are being protected.
The general concept of tort law does not answer who is required to pay for
the harms and under what mechanisms a person must be compensated.
B. Tort Theory
Labeling statutes as torts does not help ground the statute in a
theoretical framework. This difficulty relates to three features of tort
theory. First, tort law lacks a consistent unifying theory or even a
manageable menu of theoretical considerations. Professor Jules Coleman
explains the “law of torts is extremely complex and . . . resists simple
analysis.”209 One commentator describes modern tort law as
“schizophrenic, at cross-purposes.”210 Second, it is often unclear whether
tort theory is meant to be descriptive or normative.211 Third, much of the
theoretical tort work considers certain types of harms, such as personal
206. Id. at 77.
207. Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 494 (1989).
208. Levin, supra note 184, at 1; see also United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235 (1992)
(“Indeed, one of the hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of
damages to compensate the plaintiff fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights.”
(quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Perhaps
most controversially, many tort theorists describe causation as central to tort law. Honoré, supra
note 205, at 80; Weinrib, supra note 207, at 494. A general concept of causation is not helpful to
resolving many statutory questions because it does not describe how close the causal connection
needs to be and also does not describe when causation alone will be an insufficient basis for
imposing liability.
209. Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 428
(1982).
210. Englard, supra note 192, at 29 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 186, at 99, 100 (noting the controversy of the idea that
wealth maximization is a descriptively adequate way to describe tort law).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/3

32

Sperino: The Tort Label

2014]

THE TORT LABEL

1083

injury, and it is difficult to understand how this work would carry over
into the discrimination context with a more complex harm doctrine.
Tort law does not have a central theoretical unifying theory, aim,
principle, or foundation. Professor Michael L. Rustad explains that tort law
is a “multi-paradigmatic field” that emphasizes a broad range of goals such
as morality, corrective justice, social utility, and policy.212 Some scholars
argue that tort law should be grounded in corrective justice, while others
argue that the dominant consideration should be economic efficiency.213
Some identify distributive goals as a major facet of modern tort law.214
Professor Ernest Weinrib describes instrumentalist approaches to tort law
as “focusing on goals, such as compensation, deterrence, loss-spreading,
cheapest cost avoidance, or wealth maximization” and whether tort law
accomplishes them.215 Many scholars concede that the theoretical aspects
of tort law they prefer do not adequately resolve or describe all aspects of
tort law.216 Some scholars even celebrate the multiple aims and functions
of tort law.217
There is strong disagreement in tort scholarship about the goals and
functions of tort law.218 Likewise, there is strong disagreement about its
proper scope. Some scholars posit that tort law allows courts to engage in
social engineering while others believe torts should return to more limited
functions.219 Further, it often is difficult to parse the exact line between
torts and other areas, such as criminal law and contracts.220

212. Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 435–36 (2011).
213. Coleman, supra note 209, at 421. Some even argue that ideas of corrective justice should
be grounded in economic principles. Id.; see also Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of
Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 427, 427 (1992) (noting the tendency to try to ground tort law
in “one fundamental, overarching principle”).
214. See Englard, supra note 192, at 28.
215. Weinrib, supra note 207, at 487.
216. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 211, at 101.
217. See, e.g., Izhak Englard, The Idea of Complementarity as a Philosophical Basis for
Pluralism in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 186, at 183, 183.
218. See Rustad, supra note 212, at 437–39, 448; John C.P. Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the
Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1512 (2002) (“If, for Koenig and Rustad, the
great thing about tort is that it permits judges and juries to adopt the role of unappointed corporate
ombudsmen, for Posner the great thing about tort is that it permits judges to act as roving efficiency
commissioners charged with the task of identifying and achieving the cost-efficient mix of
precaution and injury.”). See generally Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective
Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349 (1992) (discussing the moral foundation for the fault principle in corrective
justice); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973) (discussing
the tension between economic and fairness theories of tort as they relate to negligence and strict
liability theories).
219. Rustad, supra note 212, at 437–39, 454.
220. Id. at 435–36.
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Scholars who do agree on the correct theoretical framework for viewing
tort law often disagree about how to define core concepts within the
framework.221 Consider a group of individuals who all agree that tort law
should be driven by cost-benefit analysis. These individuals may still
possess widely divergent opinions about who is the best party to be liable
for conduct. Some may want the party best financially able to pay, while
others may want the loss to fall on parties who can obtain insurance. Some
cost-benefit advocates may want to maximize utility or promote
efficiency.222
Even scholars that agree on the appropriate theoretical construct
disagree on how much work the construct can do descriptively or
normatively.223 A tort theory that explains why liability exists may not
explain who is responsible for compensating for the wrong and under what
circumstances. It also is unlikely that such a theory would explain how the
proof requirements for establishing violations should function.224
The search for a unifying theme becomes more complex because it is
often unclear whether theoretical arguments are “about the ideal system of
tort law” or “interpretive accounts of the common law of torts.”225
Theoretical scholars also disagree on correct accounts of tort law’s history
and modern practice.226
Further, much of the theoretical work in tort law addresses a certain
class of harms, such as personal injury, or a particular type of tort, such as
negligence.227 And this theoretical work may be incomplete in its
221. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 186, at 53, 58 (“Those who have offered corrective justice accounts of
tort law differ with respect to: (1) the conditions of responsibility; (2) whether in order to invoke
corrective justice, losses must be wrongful; (3) what makes conduct wrongful within the ambit of
corrective justice—and more.”); id. at 66 (noting that areas of convergence among corrective justice
theories of tort law include ideas of human agency, rectification, and correlativity).
222. LEVIN, supra note 184, at 45.
223. Coleman, supra note 209, at 429 (explaining differences among scholars and
commentators who agree that tort law can be explained through corrective justice). Coleman
explains, “Epstein, Fletcher, and myself reach different conclusions regarding the extent to which
the principle of corrective justice could figure in an adequate theory of liability and recovery in
torts . . . .” Id. at 435.
224. See Guido Calabresi & Alvin K. Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 585, 592–93 (1985).
225. George P. Fletcher, The Search for Synthesis in Tort Theory, in TORT LAW 105, 105
(Ernest J. Weinrib ed., 1991).
226. Goldberg, supra note 218, at 1504–06 (providing a history of tort law). See generally
Rustad, supra note 212 (contesting Professor Goldberg’s historical account); CHAMALLAS &
WRIGGINS, supra note 187, at 63 (discussing how negligence is considered to be the theoretical and
practical core of the field and discussing the Restatement’s reference to accidental injury as the core
problem of tort law).
227. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 225, at 106 (limiting his inquiry to personal injury, “the
core injury in the law of torts”); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 201, at 923–24, 955, 977.
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descriptive or normative force related to other types of injury. Even more
broadly based theoretical work has difficulty contending with certain
pockets of obligation.228 When theoretical precepts are applied more
broadly, they often describe more traditional forms of injury or harm.229
For statutes, it may be difficult to determine whether statutory definitions
of harm or injury that do not comport with traditional tort conceptions of
those concepts fit well within the theoretical paradigm.
Even if the broader field of torts is broken down to its component parts,
such as negligence or intentional torts, there is little useful theoretical
ground to mine for purposes of statutory interpretation. Since much of the
theoretical work focuses on negligence law, the theoretical indeterminacy
discussed above makes negligence theory problematic in the statutory
context. However, even intentional tort law and strict liability suffer from
the same problems.230
These problems exist even if one ignores practical issues, such as
determining how tort theory is translated into workable legal doctrines.
When courts espouse tort principles in specific cases, it is unclear how
much of the doctrine is being driven by the specific case and how much is
driven by tort theory.231 Further, judges describing and developing tort law
may be unaware of or even hostile to tort theory. In many instances, judges
do not describe the basis for a legal standard.232
C. The General Tort Law Fallacy
Some might argue that while looking to definitions or theory is not
helpful, relying on tort doctrine provides solutions to statutory
interpretation problems. At times, courts have claimed to invoke the
general common law to resolve a problem. A major goal of this Article is
to eradicate references to the “general common law” in statutory
construction, because there is no general common law for most tort
questions.
228. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 201, at 951–52 (noting the difficulty wrongs-based
theories of tort law encounter with strict liability).
229. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY: TOWARD A REFORMULATION OF
TORT LAW 15–49 (Cato Inst. 1980) (describing a theory of torts premised on causation by using
paradigms such as “A hit B”).
230. Stephen R. Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 147, 147 (1988) (“[A] general theory of strict liability is . . . not even a
possibility. . . .”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional
Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127, 135–39 (1981); see also Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., An Economic
Theory of Intentional Torts: A Comment, 3 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 51–52 (1983); EPSTEIN,
supra note 229, at 68 (discussing how his strict liability theory prioritizes notions of individual
liberty over notions of negligence).
231. Fletcher, supra note 225, at 130.
232. LEVIN, supra note 184, at 30.
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An example may be helpful. In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, the Supreme
Court applied the concept of proximate cause to the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).233 The Court
stated: “[W]hen Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of
general tort law.”234 It then purported to apply a general common law
standard of proximate cause to USERRA.235 However, the Court’s
reference to a general common law of proximate cause is illusory. There is
simply no uniform view of proximate cause that applies across all tort
regimes. Rather, the meaning of proximate cause and the importance of it
within tort analysis changes depending on the underlying tort at issue.
Importantly, the Court does not explicitly recognize that proximate cause
most often plays a role in negligence and strict liability cases and that it is
rarely used in the intentional tort context.236 It ignores the basic fact that
many tort doctrines differ depending on the underlying pocket of obligation
under consideration.
A nonexhaustive list of other examples is helpful. Foundational
concepts such as factual and legal cause have different iterations and
importance, depending on whether the underlying tort is characterized as
an intentional tort or negligence.237 Contributory negligence is a defense to
negligence claims, but not typically to intentional torts.238 Punitive
damages are available for certain kinds of torts and not for others.239 The
types of torts at issue often affect contribution rules.240
The way the Supreme Court invokes tort law often ignores the options
tort law provides. Staub is a good example of the dangers of the tort label.
The Court exaggerates the work that tort law can perform by failing to fully
and accurately describe the various options available under tort law. In
Staub, the Supreme Court imported proximate cause into USERRA
without reconciling the contested and varying iterations of proximate
cause.241 Indeed, the Staub Court could have used tort law to reach the
opposite holding that cat’s paw liability existed without a proximate cause
233. 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190–92 (2011). For a comprehensive discussion of Staub, see generally
Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431 (2012) (arguing
that Staub adds an element to the plaintiff’s burden in employment discrimination cases).
234. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1991.
235. Id. at 1192–93.
236. David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1773
n.30 (1997); Belton, supra note 1, at 1250.
237. Tony Honoré, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 186, at 363, 363 (noting that causation depends on whether fault or strict
liability is at issue).
238. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 201, at 967.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (2011).
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limitation. It could have reasoned that discrimination is an intentional tort
and that intentional torts do not typically rely on notions of proximate
cause.
Gross and Nassar also suffer from the same flawed reasoning. Both
cases held that tort law required a plaintiff to establish “but for” cause.242
Tort law provides a “but for” cause standard in some instances, but it also
allows a plaintiff to establish causation using a “substantial factor”
standard in instances where “but for” cause is problematic.243 Tort law also
allows the court to shift the burden of disproving causation to the
defendants in certain instances.244 These two characteristics of causation
are basic ideas that are taught in first-year torts classes. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court failed to consider whether discrimination cases fit within
the class of cases for which “but for” cause is inadequate and also failed to
consider whether discrimination cases present scenarios in which shifting
burdens to the defendant would be appropriate. The Court thus relied on a
selected slice of tort law that is narrower than the common law. The
Supreme Court made important choices about what version of tort law to
rely on, but these choices are hidden within a purportedly textual analysis
in which the Court misrepresents the uniformity of the common law.
V. THE STAKES OF THE TORT LABEL
The tort label dramatically distorts the way that courts make decisions
relating to the discrimination statutes. This Article urges courts to engage
in a more honest and intellectually compelling interpretation of the
discrimination statutes, an interpretation that fully comprehends existing
ambiguities within both discrimination and tort law. In undertaking this
task, this Article gives proper deference to legal realists and critical race
and feminist scholars who generally question the interpretive enterprise. As
noted by others, “between the extremes of ‘formalism’ and radical
skepticism, there is substantial room in which to operate.”245 This Part
outlines the stakes if the courts continue on their current interpretive path.
A. Limited Reasoning
The tort label is dangerous because it allows courts to ignore the central
problems of employment discrimination. The consequences of the tort
label when combined with a narrow vision of tort law can best be
illustrated by imagining what the disparate impact doctrine would look like
if the Supreme Court had applied this narrow tort lens in 1971. The Court
242.
243.
244.
245.

See supra notes 91, 109 and accompanying text.
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 191, at 730.
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would have reasoned that Title VII is a tort, that torts require either but-for
or substantial-factor causation, and that no individual could prove that the
company’s policies (rather than societal discrimination) caused the harm.
Even those that disagree with the disparate impact theory would agree that
this reasoning is inadequate to the kind of problem posed in the Griggs
case.246
Many important employment discrimination questions remain
unanswered. Unconscious discrimination theorists posit that discrimination
is not always caused by conscious animus against a protected group.247
Structural discrimination theorists propose that the locus of
discrimination is not always a bad individual or a company policy but
rather unthinking assumptions about how work is organized.248 Structural
discrimination often occurs from a mix of intentional, negligent, and
unconscious motives and actions.
Courts have not yet fully considered structural discrimination and
unconscious discrimination cases, but it easy to see how the tort label
analysis could be used to reject these kinds of claims without any true
discussion. Courts could analogize discrimination law to a fixed, narrow
version of tort law with a “purely mechanistic depiction of causation,” a
failure to fully imagine how groups and entities can cause harm, and an
inability to fully capture systemic risk.249 If courts view discrimination
statutes as torts, then they can easily use tort law to deny structural and
unconscious discrimination claims. This interpretation would not require
any dialogue about the purposes of employment discrimination law, how
protected traits limit people within modern workplaces, or whether
Congress meant to reach these types of claims.
Courts may be unwilling to recognize claims of structural and
unconscious discrimination, but simply claiming that tort law requires such
a result is inadequate.250 This limited reasoning is not demanded by the
discrimination statutes’ language, structure, or purposes. Nor does
congressional intent or Court precedent demand such limited analysis.
246. For a discussion of Griggs, see supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
247. See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA.
L. REV. 741, 745 (2005); Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive
in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 419 (2000); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322–27
(1987).
248. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account
of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 92, 126–27, 138 (2003).
249. Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 6
(2011) (noting how tort law lags in its recognition of systemic risk and harm).
250. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (arguing that courts may not be willing to go beyond the traditionally
accepted underpinnings of discrimination law).
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The tort label also unnecessarily limits the choices available under the
statutes. It does this by prioritizing tort meanings over other available
meanings. It then compounds this problem by oversimplifying tort law and
describing it as more uniform and less contested than it actually is.
Take again the factual cause issue discussed throughout this Article.
There are numerous plausible standards that courts could invoke to
describe causation under the discrimination statutes’ original operative
language, including “but for” cause, substantial factor, or motivating
factor. The courts could diminish the importance of the factual cause
inquiry in cases where plaintiffs prove intent. The courts could shift
various portions of the causation burden to different parties. Tort label
analysis reduced all of these options to one without explaining why. The
Supreme Court’s claim that discrimination is a tort, and that tort law has a
uniform, narrow view of causation, hides these choices.
B. Consistently Poor Analysis
One key problem with applying the tort label to employment
discrimination statutes is that the courts and EEOC seem ill equipped to
apply it well. As discussed throughout this Article, the Supreme Court has
relied on certain assumptions that are simply untrue, such as the idea that a
general common law exists.251 They have incorrectly represented the
common law as monolithic across different types of torts and failed to
understand the potential breadth within each tort doctrine. They have failed
to recognize the relational nature of words within tort doctrines. They have
ignored that employment discrimination statutes modify key aspects of atwill employment, that they do not use unique tort terms of art, and that they
are not structured like torts. The courts have also failed to understand that
only weak arguments support the automatic reach to tort law and that
stronger textual and purpose-based arguments countenance greatly
reducing tort law’s role.
The tort label, when combined with a textual approach to interpretation,
also ignores a fundamental difference between tort elements and statutory
regimes. Modern statutes often provide complex, interrelated provisions to
calibrate when liability should attach and to further the regime’s underlying
goals.252 Importing the common law without considering the entire
statutory regime risks upsetting congressional judgments about these
issues.
If future analysis just avoided these critical mistakes, it would be
significantly less flawed than the current approach. It is unclear whether
the poor analysis is due to a failure to understand tort law or whether it is
251. See supra Section IV.C.
252. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (Title VII).
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an intentional attempt to hide policymaking. Whatever the source, it is
concerning whenever a particular reasoning device routinely leads to
results that do not make sense when subjected to scrutiny.
These mistakes are not confined to the Supreme Court. In 2012, the
EEOC issued regulations interpreting the meaning of the reasonable factor
other than age (RFOA) provision under the ADEA.253 The EEOC
considered how the RFOA provision operates in disparate impact cases.254
As discussed above, disparate impact cases do not share a common
heritage with tort law. The first step of a disparate impact claim requires
the plaintiff to establish that a specific employment practice created a
disproportionate impact because of a protected trait.255 This is a standard
that has no corollary in common law causation or intent.
The second step in an ADEA disparate impact case is for the employer
to establish that the disparate impact was due to a RFOA.256 The courts
have not fully explained what RFOA means, but the case law to date
suggests the employer’s required proof would be minimal.257 In an
admirable effort to give the RFOA standard more meaning, the EEOC
issued 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(e). In issuing the regulation, the EEOC indicated
that it relied on §§ 292 and 298 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.258
Any critique of the EEOC’s efforts should begin with a complimentary
nod toward the political reasoning that undergirds its efforts. The EEOC is
using the tort label to make its more pro-plaintiff definition of this doctrine
palatable by tying it to a conservative source of law—the common law.
While understanding that this move is politically savvy, it is important to
consider whether the general move to tort law is a good one for the
employment discrimination statutes generally. This is especially true
because of the possibility that introducing tort law in one area will lead to
further convergence of tort and employment discrimination law in other
ways.259
There are several problematic aspects of the EEOC’s reasoning. Both
§§ 292 and 298 of the Restatement govern negligence claims.260 The
EEOC thus tries to graft a partial negligence analysis as the second step in
a disparate impact analysis that is not based on tort law generally or
negligence law specifically.
253. EEOC Regulations, supra note 105, at 19095.
254. Id.
255. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005).
256. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 96 (2008).
257. Judith J. Johnson, Reasonable Factors Other Than Age: The Emerging Specter of Ageist
Stereotypes, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 49, 80–81 (2009).
258. EEOC Regulations, supra note 105, at 19089–90 nn.71, 73.
259. Laurin, supra note 183, at 710.
260 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 292, 298 (1965).
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Section 292 of the Restatement governs the factors to be considered in
determining the utility of an actor’s conduct.261 Yet the EEOC did not
resolve whether its regulation imported ideas such as the Hand formula and
economic efficiency into the ADEA. Importantly, ideas about the utility of
an actor’s conduct are especially value laden and thus courts will have
great leeway in judging this utility. Applying a subsection based on utility
concerns is especially problematic in the discrimination context because it
suggests that the underlying goals of the discrimination statutes might be
subject to some form of cost-benefit analysis.
Also interesting is the EEOC’s choice to insert portions of the
negligence analysis into an RFOA inquiry that otherwise does not look like
negligence analysis. For example, the new regulation requires courts to
consider whether “the factor is related to the employer’s stated business
purpose.”262 There is very little discussion regarding how select portions of
the negligence standard are supposed to intersect with the ADEA-specific
portions of the regulation. The EEOC picks and chooses pieces of the
Restatement’s negligence analysis but does not explain whether the
remaining sections should be used in RFOA decisions or in interpreting the
ADEA more broadly.
In disparate impact cases, the defendant is the one raising RFOA. The
burdens of production and persuasion mimic those of affirmative defenses.
Yet the EEOC relies on negligence analysis to interpret RFOA, while also
claiming that it is not adopting negligence concepts that are often raised
and proved by defendants such as contributory negligence and assumption
of risk.263
While the EEOC does note that it is not adopting the tort law
wholesale, it does not answer the difficult questions related to its use of
tort law.264 Was it necessary to use tort law? What work does tort law
actually perform? Why did it choose tort law? Why did it rely on standards
for negligence that largely apply in a physical harm context? Can courts
use other principles in the surrounding sections of the Restatement to
define RFOA? Why did the agency use the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
rather than the Restatement (Third) of Torts? Is the ADEA generally
amenable to tort analysis? Like much tort analysis in discrimination cases,
the reader is left without a clear understanding of whether an independent
tort principle commands a certain outcome or whether tort law could
justify almost any regulation the EEOC wanted to craft.
261. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292 (1965).
262. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(e)(2)(i) (2013).
263. EEOC Regulations, supra note 105, at 19083. The author agrees that neither of these
concepts should apply to disparate impact; however, by amorphously inserting negligence
references in the RFOA calculus, courts should expect defendants to start making such arguments.
264. Id.
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When courts use the tort label, they often engage in similarly
unsatisfying reasoning. For example, in Staub, the Supreme Court
indicated that the use of causal factor language in a statute incorporates
“the traditional tort-law concept of proximate cause.”265 This statement
suggests that there is a fixed and constant theoretical and factual
application of proximate cause. This statement ignores the fact that
proximate cause is a notoriously complex concept with contested goals.266
Staub never explains why USERRA is a tort or how much tort doctrine can
be used to interpret its provisions. Courts often apply the tort label in this
cursory way.
There is strong disagreement regarding the appropriate role of the
courts in making statutory inquiries, such as whether the courts should
consider only Congress’s expectations as actually expressed in statutory
language, whether they should ascertain intent from other sources, or
whether courts have broader powers to engage in common law decisionmaking or decision-making that relies on the broader purposes of the
underlying statutory regimes.267 At a minimum, though, it is appropriate to
demand that courts use reasoning devices that meet some basic level of
legal reasoning. Given the number of analytical missteps in the way courts
apply tort law to discrimination law, it is debatable whether the use of the
tort label meets minimal standards for judicial reasoning.
C. The Fuzzy Nature of the Tort Label
The tort label also is highly susceptible to manipulation, especially
given the way that courts currently use it.268 Strangely, the tort label both
265. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (2011).
266. See Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the
Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 51 (1991); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 250 (9th
ed. 2009) (providing multiple definitions of proximate cause and indicating that the following terms
also reflect proximate cause: direct cause, efficient cause, legal cause, procuring cause, and remote
cause, among others). Further, the definition of proximate cause has changed over time.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. a
(2010).
267. See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 3, 5 (1999) (discussing “ordinary judging” and arguing that judges can
“help[] the legislature implement good government by fitting statutes into their past and their
future”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) (arguing for a
more fluid notion of statutory interpretation); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 5–7 (1982) (arguing that so-called judicial activism is actually a function courts perform
in diminishing the importance of outdated statutes “in the face of the manifest incapacity of
legislatures to keep those statutes up to date”).
268. The courts’ jurisprudence about when to apply the tort label is so unstable that the
decision whether to even apply the label is confusing and fails to provide any guidance about the
potential outcome of future cases. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 492 (1994) (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“While I do not object to referring to the common law when resolving
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closes avenues of potential argument and at the same time often provides
the courts with an empty vessel they can later fill with their own non-tort
meaning. The tort label gives the appearance that courts are tying statutory
interpretation to traditional sources of law, but the courts often misstate the
traditional sources of law or radically alter them without explanation.
As discussed throughout this Article, courts use the tort label to
foreclose the possibility of statutory ambiguity. For example, the words
“because of” mean tort causation and tort causation requires the plaintiff to
establish “but for” cause. This reasoning makes several debatable
assumptions. The words “because of” are not common law terms of art
and, given the structure of the discrimination statutes and decades of
precedent, it is unlikely that the common law is the only source of meaning
for these words. Further, there are several iterations of common law
causation. Statutory ambiguity might countenance the use of nontextual
sources of meaning and would also allow for administrative agencies to
play a greater role in shaping the law. The tort label hides these statutory
ambiguities and forecloses textually plausible interpretations of the
discrimination statutes.
In many cases, there is no plausible claim that the common law
demands a particular choice because the common law itself is not uniform.
The difficulty of using common law words is complicated because the
same words often have different meanings in different pockets of
obligation, in response to different factual situations, and even over time.
Whenever the underlying common law doctrine has contested meanings or
goals, the courts often provide little analysis about why they chose certain
meanings or goals over others.
At times, the courts choose not to resolve underlying ambiguities of the
common law tort concepts they adopt. In Staub, for example, the Court
described proximate cause as being concerned with whether there is a
“direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct
alleged,” with whether the cause is “too remote, purely contingent, or
indirect,” and with whether the cause was of “independent origin that was
not foreseeable.”269 Thus, the Court cited multiple proximate cause
rationales that might lead to different results in different factual
contexts.270 When courts fail to resolve the underlying disarray within a
common law concept, they risk importing an empty vessel into a statutory
regime. Thus, a particular term has no fixed definition, but can take
the question this case presents, I do not think that the existence of [a] tort . . . alone provides the
answer.”).
269. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192 (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of N.Y., 130 S. Ct. 983, 989
(2010) and Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
270. Id.
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whatever meaning or meanings the court chooses to apply in a particular
instance.271
Courts also claim to invoke the mantle of traditional common law
principles, while issuing opinions that do not necessarily follow from the
common law. Take, for example, the Supreme Court’s use of a tort/agency
analysis. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court held that
sexual harassment claims were cognizable under Title VII, but then noted,
with only a cursory discussion, that the employer would not be held
automatically liable for all harassment that occurred in the workplace.272
The Court noted in Meritor that the use of the word “agent” in Title VII
evinced an intent to place a limit on the actions for which employers would
be held liable, and then it cited the Restatement.273 The Court indicated that
agency principles might play a role in such cases, but declined to further
describe what role they would play.274 This slim reed would be the entry
point through which the Supreme Court later justified its purported use of
common law agency principles in Title VII.
In two subsequent cases, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Court took on the question left
open in Meritor. In Faragher, the Court transformed Meritor’s
noncommittal phrasing into strong pronouncements. The Court indicated
that Meritor expressed the idea that courts look to the common law of
agency to develop employer liability standards, even though Meritor
cannot be read this broadly.275 Although the Faragher court noted that the
Meritor court cautioned that “common-law agency principles may not be
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII,” the Faragher Court
transformed Meritor’s citing of the Restatement into an embrace of
common law agency principles.276
Importantly, the Court’s invocation of the common law and the way
that it presented the common law doctrines foreclosed the possibility that
271. Another example of this type of reasoning is found in Clackamas Gastroenterology
Associates v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003). In Clackamas, the Court purported to adopt a common
law test to determine whether a shareholder–director was an employee under discrimination law,
even after the Court admitted that the traditional common law did not recognize the type of legal
entity at issue in the lawsuit and thus did not directly address the question before the Court. Id. at
447. Further, the Court altered the common law it claimed to adopt, while also failing to address
why it rejected the economic realities test used in other employment contexts. Id. at 448–50
(explaining that “[a]t common law the relevant factors defining the master-servant relationship
focus on the master’s control over the servant” and then announcing six factors relevant in the
inquiry).
272. Meritor, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67, 72 (1986).
273. Id. at 72 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219–37 (1958)).
274. Id.
275. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 791–92 (1998).
276. Id. (quoting Meritor, 447 U.S. at 72) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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employers would be automatically liable for all cognizable sexual
harassment that occurs in the workplace. This move substantially narrowed
the potential options that the court would consider in thinking about
agency.
Common law tort and agency principles entered Title VII with very
little discussion about why they should be imported. Noticeably, the Court
did not seriously grapple with whether Title VII, either descriptively or
normatively, was created against a backdrop of the common law. Neither
of the opinions engaged in a searching analysis of the text, intent, or
purpose of Title VII with regard to whether the statutes imported common
law agency principles. Nor did the Court explore what the use of the
common law in the statutory regime says about the appropriate link
between the common law and statutes.
After using the label of common law agency, the Court then created an
agency analysis for Title VII that does not mimic the common law of
agency. The Supreme Court held that employers will be automatically
liable if they take a tangible employment action against employees.277 In
cases where a supervisor engages in harassment that does not result in a
tangible employment action, the employer can prevail if it proves a twopart affirmative defense.278 The Court created this test by using the general
idea of agency, the principle of avoidable consequences from tort law, and
by creating a new goal for Title VII: that it was designed not only to
remedy discrimination, but to prevent it from happening in the first
place.279
The Court thus used the common law label to justify creating an
analysis that is completely unlike the common law.280 Professor Michael
Harper noted the Court “cited no common law cases in [its] cursory,
formal, and rather abstract discussion of the Restatement exception on
which [it] relied.”281
Even though the Court issued Faragher and Ellerth on the same day, it
did not create a uniform rationale for why agency analysis should be
imported into Title VII. For example, in Ellerth, the Court’s opinion
focused on the strands of agency analysis that impute liability to the

277. Id. at 807.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 804–06.
280. Id. at 797, 802 n.3 (stating that “[t]he proper analysis, here, then, calls not for a
mechanical application of indefinite and malleable factors” from the Restatement, and also
indicating that the Court was not using pure common law).
281. Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title VII: A Functional
Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 41, 55 (1999).
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employer when the employee is aided by the agency relationship.282 In
Faragher, by contrast, the Court noted that liability might be imputed
because the supervisor is aided by the employer,283 but also noted that
liability might be appropriate because the supervisor is acting as a proxy
for the company284 or because the supervisor is acting within the scope of
his authority.285 Even stranger, Faragher then appears to not rely on any of
these rationales and instead conducts “an [i]nquiry into the reasons that
would support a conclusion that harassing behavior ought to be held within
the scope of a supervisor’s employment.”286
Not only did the Supreme Court fail to resolve the proper theoretical
basis for importing tort and agency principles, it could not even agree on
the proper source from which to derive those principles. For example,
Ellerth relied heavily on the Restatement, which it believed enunciated the
“general common law of agency, rather than on the law of any particular
State.”287 However, Faragher explicitly rejected “a mechanical application
of indefinite and malleable factors set forth in the Restatement.”288
After all of these retreats from the common law standard, it is fair to say
that the Supreme Court did not import common law agency into Title VII,
but rather used vague and amorphous ideas centered on a theme of agency
to create a new analysis for Title VII. This leads to the question of why the
Supreme Court felt the need to start with the common law at all.
Reaching to common law helps to hide the level of policymaking in
which the Court is engaging. It gives the impression that the courts are
engaging in a traditional analysis. Notice that this Article is not arguing
that courts should never engage in interpretation that results in
policymaking. However, it questions whether we can ever fully understand
the extent of what the courts are doing if they continue to claim reliance on
what appears to be a traditional analysis. A more honest opinion would
have declared that Congress failed to define the term “agent” under the
statute, that there are many competing definitions of employer liability for
the acts of agents from a wide variety of sources (including the common
law), that the statutory language provides little basis for differentiating
between these standards, and then described how the Court navigated
282. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (“Although few courts have
elaborated how agency principles support this rule, we think it reflects a correct application of the
aided in the agency relationship standard.”).
283. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789.
284. Id. at 789–90.
285. Id. at 791.
286. Id. at 797.
287. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
740 (1989)).
288. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 797.
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through these options. Instead, the Court ended up with an unsatisfying
analysis because it tried to cram Title VII into a common law box.
D. The Priority Problem
Another fundamental problem with the tort label is the way it prioritizes
the common law over other potential sources of statutory meaning and
dramatically limits administrative deference.
When courts define employment discrimination as torts, they conceive
tort law as deriving from the common law, not other statutes. Thus, while
the Supreme Court labels discrimination statutes as statutory torts, these
statutory torts do not serve as a source of meaning for interpretive
questions. Rather, when the Court refers to tort law, it means the common
law. When courts search for tort law, they refer to various Restatements or
to state common law, but usually do not include federal statutory law
within the definition of federal common law.289 Even when courts cite
prior statutory cases, these cases often relied heavily on common law
iterations of the underlying doctrines.290
This is an impoverished view of tort law. If discrimination and other
statutes are torts, then courts should be able to draw tort meaning from
them, as well as from other statutes that courts have labeled as torts.
Through statutes, Congress has radically changed notions of causation.
Take for example the disparate impact inquiry under the discrimination
statutes.291 Another example is the causation standard adopted in the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases, in which the courts have rejected
application of traditional factual cause.292 Statutes, including portions of
Title VII that were interpreted prior to the tort label, express different
notions of causation, intent and harm than those found in the common law.
One of the few good reasons for applying the tort label to discrimination
law would be that early thinking about causation, intent, and harm under
289. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 540 F.2d 1224, 1229 (4th Cir. 1976)
(considering whether a federal statute provided for certain damages, the court, instead of conducting
statutory interpretation, looked at the Restatement (Second) of Torts for guidance).
290. For example, in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192 (2011), the Court cited
several statutory cases that purport to be based on the common law. See Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of
N.Y., 130 S. Ct. 983, 989 (2010) (“Proximate cause for RICO purposes . . . should be evaluated in
light of its common-law foundations . . . .”); Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004)
(“Although we agree the statute is in terms only jurisdictional, we think that at the time of
enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined
by the law of nations and recognized at common law.”).
291. See supra Section V.B.
292. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2636 (2011) (“FELA’s language on
causation . . . ‘is as broad as could be framed.’ Given the breadth of the [causation] phrase . . . we
have recognized that, in comparison to tort litigation at common law, ‘a relaxed standard of
causation applies under FELA.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181
(1949) and Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 543 (1994))).
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Title VII could be extended into other areas.
When the courts look only to the common law to answer statutory
questions, they ignore other potential sources of meaning. Prioritizing the
common law is puzzling because there is ample evidence that the
discrimination statutes rely on concepts from the National Labor Relations
Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and state employment discrimination
statutes.293
The Supreme Court tort label analysis also decreases the role of the
EEOC to interpret statutory ambiguity. According to the Supreme Court,
certain words in the discrimination statutes clearly require certain tort
meanings. In making this claim, the Court is refusing to recognize any
potential ambiguity in the statutory language. Denying ambiguity is
important because it means that the Court will not be required to examine
whether the EEOC’s views on a particular issue are entitled to
deference.294
CONCLUSION
The tort label leads to reasoning that is superficial and not transparent
about its motivations and goals. Courts do not engage in nuanced
discussions about the kind of reasoning they are using or the values they
are prioritizing in reaching the result. Importantly, the tort label gives the
appearance that the courts are engaging in a form of traditional analysis
that is noncontroversial.
This Article argues that multiple claims courts make about the
employment discrimination statutes related to the tort label are so baseless
that they do not even reach a minimal level of legitimate reasoning. Claims
that a general common law exists, that core substantive words derive solely
or even primarily from pure common law, or that the common law is and
should be the starting point for statutory analysis are not supportable.
In rejecting the automatic prioritizing of tort law, this Article challenges
courts to reconcile competing sources of meaning in employment
discrimination law and discuss why the court is choosing one option over
others. While this method may appear to be more difficult than current tort
reasoning, it is only so because the tort label suppresses many important
discussions. Hopefully, jettisoning the tort label will lead to statutory
analysis that is more rigorous and honestly performed.

293. See supra notes 33, 146 and accompanying text.
294. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1994); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
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